Journal of Liberty and International Affairs · Volume 12 · Number 1 · 2026 · eISSN 1857-9760
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com

Copyright © 2026 The author/s
This work is licensed under the CC BY 4.0 license
(*) Corresponding author
Peer review method: Double-blind
Research article
DOI: https://doi.org/10.47305/jlia.2026.2004
Received: 16.08.2025 • Accepted after revision: 18.01.2026 • Published: 23.01.2026
Pages: 39-60

Reshaping European Security: Multidimensional Implications of the Russia–Ukraine Conflict

Nghiem Tuan Hung[1], Hoang Khac Nam[2], Le Hoang Kiet[3*]

[1]Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam ✉ tuanhung3110@gmail.com
[2]University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, Vietnam ✉ hknam84@yahoo.com
[3]University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, Vietnam ✉ kietlh.tg@yersin.edu.vn

Abstract
The Russia–Ukraine conflict has fundamentally reshaped Europe's security architecture, eroding the post–Cold War order established after 1991. This study analyzes its impact during the Biden administration across political and diplomatic relations, defense modernization, and non-traditional security challenges, including terrorism, migration, energy security, and food security. Drawing on realist theory and the Copenhagen School's securitization framework, the study shows how the conflict reflects great-power competition and how the European Union has securitized non-traditional threats. The findings indicate a sharp deterioration in Russia–Western relations, unprecedented European rearmament, intensified challenges from migration and terrorism, reduced dependence on Russian energy, and coordinated international efforts to stabilize food markets. The study highlights Europe's accelerated move toward strategic autonomy and the continuing need for multilateral cooperation and peaceful conflict resolution.

Keywords
Russia–Ukraine Conflict; European Security; Strategic Autonomy; Securitization; Energy Security; Great-Power Competition; International Affairs

INTRODUCTION

The Russia–Ukraine conflict stands as one of the most consequential geopolitical ruptures of the post–Cold War era, fundamentally reshaping Europe's security architecture and upending the international norms that have governed the continent since 1991. This protracted conflict has triggered profound transformations in diplomatic relations, security frameworks, and economic interdependencies across the Euro-Atlantic region, with ripple effects resonating throughout global governance structures and international power dynamics (Raik et al. 2024; Sadowska 2022).

The escalating confrontations have effectively dismantled the European security order painstakingly constructed over three decades, including foundational agreements such as the Paris Charter for a New Europe and the 1995 institutionalization of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Kiet et al. 2025). This breakdown has compelled governments and multilateral institutions to fundamentally reassess their security policies in an era in which major powers increasingly resort to hard power to advance national interests, often with limited regard for international legal constraints.

In response, the European Union (EU), NATO, and individual European states have undertaken sweeping revisions of their security doctrines and foreign policy orientations. These strategic shifts have been remarkable: Sweden and Finland abandoned centuries-old neutrality

to join NATO; the EU accelerated defense integration through Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO); and even Switzerland, long regarded as the epitome of neutrality, increased its military exercises with NATO from 10 in 2023 to 24 in 2024 (Phong 2024).

This article examines how the conflict reshaped European security during the Biden administration across five critical domains: political and diplomatic relations, defense modernization, terrorism and migration challenges, energy security, and food security. The analysis aims to provide policymakers and researchers with essential insights into the fundamental transformations that occurred during this pivotal period, while advancing both theoretical and practical understanding of contemporary security challenges within an international system profoundly altered by this conflict.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The impact of the Russia–Ukraine conflict on European security has emerged as a critical field of scholarly inquiry, with researchers examining transformations across political, military, economic, and social domains. This review synthesizes key academic contributions that inform understanding of how the conflict has fundamentally reshaped Europe's security architecture, while establishing the theoretical framework guiding this analysis.

This study employs realism as its primary theoretical lens, recognizing that the conflict exemplifies classic patterns of great-power competition in which states prioritize security and relative power gains (Kiet et al. 2026). The conflict demonstrates how major powers increasingly employ hard power to advance national security objectives, often with limited regard for international legal constraints (Raik et al. 2024; Kiet et al. 2025). Complementing this realist perspective, the Copenhagen School's securitization theory helps explain how the European Union (EU) has transformed energy and migration from economic or social concerns into existential security threats requiring extraordinary policy measures (Fetzer and Nikolovski 2025). This dual theoretical framework enables an integrated analysis of both traditional military-strategic dynamics and non-traditional security challenges arising from the conflict.

Recent scholarship highlights multiple dimensions of the conflict's transformative impact on European security. Raik et al. (2024) show how the conflict compelled the EU to abandon its traditional balancing strategy among major powers and adopt explicit geopolitical competition alongside firm alignment with the West, marking a shift from multilateral diplomacy toward hard-power politics. However, their analysis may underestimate Brussels' continued pursuit of strategic autonomy, particularly in economic and technological domains where concerns about overdependence on Washington persist. Kiet and Hiep (2025) situate this transformation within broader 21st-century great-power dynamics, arguing that the conflict has fundamentally ruptured the post–Cold War order; nonetheless, questions remain as to whether this rupture necessitates renewed bipolar confrontation or allows space for alternative security architectures. Moreover, the literature on military transformation remains emergent. Reports by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (2024; 2025) document unprecedented increases in defense spending across NATO members, signaling a qualitative shift from post–Cold War complacency toward comprehensive military readiness. This study systematically examines how these financial investments translate into changes in strategic posture and alliance consolidation.

CC BY

Energy security scholarship traces Europe's dramatic strategic pivot following the outbreak of the conflict. Sadowska (2022) demonstrates how the war transformed energy from a predominantly economic concern into an existential security imperative, exposing the complex interdependencies between the European Union (EU) and Russia that had evolved over decades. Kiet et al. (2023) examine subsequent diversification strategies and show how policymakers have navigated the tension between short-term energy security and long-term strategic autonomy. However, these early analyses could not assess the actual effectiveness of the REPowerEU initiative. This research fills that gap by examining policy outcomes through early 2025, revealing both notable successes in renewable energy deployment and persistent vulnerabilities related to nuclear fuel supply and liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports.

Significant gaps also persist in the literature on non-traditional security challenges. While Spaaij and Zammit (2024) illuminate linkages between terrorism and geopolitical instability, scholarship on the intersection of migration and security remains fragmented and underdeveloped. Similarly, although Hassen and El Bilali (2022) and Mottaleb et al. (2022) establish a foundational understanding of conflict-induced disruptions to global food systems, the long-term effectiveness of adaptation strategies requires further examination. This study addresses these gaps through a comprehensive five-domain analysis extending through 2024.

Despite growing scholarly attention, substantial gaps remain in understanding the conflict's long-term implications and the interconnections among different security domains. Much of the existing literature examines political, military, energy, and social dimensions in isolation, overlooking critical linkages, for example, how energy policy choices influence defense spending or how migration pressures shape debates on strategic autonomy. By adopting a comprehensive five-domain framework, this study addresses this fragmentation. It demonstrates how transformations in one security dimension catalyze changes in others, generating cascading effects across Europe's security architecture.

METHODOLOGY

This article employs qualitative analytical methods drawn from the social sciences to examine the multifaceted impact of the Russia–Ukraine conflict on European security during President Joe Biden's administration (February 24, 2022–January 20, 2025). A qualitative research design is appropriate given the complexity of contemporary security dynamics and the study's focus on institutional responses, policy shifts, and evolving threat perceptions.

The primary methodological approach is document analysis, which enables an in-depth examination of international relations phenomena through the systematic review of carefully selected sources. Reference materials were drawn exclusively from reputable publications released after the outbreak of the conflict to ensure both reliability and temporal relevance. The document analysis followed a four-step procedure. First, primary and secondary materials were collected from a diverse range of sources, including official reports issued by international organizations (such as the European Union, NATO, the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and Europol), research publications from leading institutes (including SIPRI and the International Energy Agency), peer-reviewed scientific articles indexed in Scopus and Web of Science databases, and major international media outlets. Second, the authenticity and reliability of the sources were assessed by examining their origins, authorship, publication dates, and data-

CC BY

collection methodologies. Third, a structured content analysis was conducted by coding and categorizing materials according to the study's core analytical themes: political-diplomatic relations, defense and military modernization, terrorism and migration, energy security, and food security. Both inductive and deductive approaches were applied to identify emerging patterns while simultaneously testing existing theoretical assumptions. Fourth, the findings were synthesized and interpreted through comparative analysis across multiple sources to enhance analytical rigor, comprehensiveness, and objectivity.

In addition, the study incorporates historical analysis to situate contemporary developments within their broader temporal and structural context. This method enables the systematic tracing of European security transformations from February 2022 to January 2025 and facilitates the identification of causal linkages and developmental trends across the examined security domains.

Several limitations should be considered when interpreting the study's findings. First, the analysis relies primarily on secondary sources, policy documents, and existing datasets, which may reflect institutional perspectives and inherent biases of the authors. Second, given the rapidly evolving nature of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, some empirical data and policy developments may have changed since the time of writing, potentially affecting the study's long-term accuracy. Third, the focus on EU and NATO responses may underrepresent the roles of other influential actors, including non-Western states, regional organizations, and domestic political dynamics within Russia and Ukraine. Finally, although the study adopts a multidimensional security framework, it does not include a quantitative assessment of causal relationships between specific policies and outcomes. This area warrants further empirical investigation.

Despite these limitations and the constraints of relying on publicly available information that cannot fully capture internal diplomatic processes, this article offers a timely and analytically valuable contribution to understanding contemporary European security dynamics, with broader implications for global security.

DIPLOMATIC REALIGNMENT AND THE NEW COLD WAR: RUSSIA–WEST RELATIONS IN CRISIS

The Russia–Ukraine conflict has generated profound structural transformations in Europe's political and diplomatic architecture, fundamentally dismantling the regional security order established by the Paris Charter for a New Europe. Signed in 1990 by European nations, the Soviet Union, the United States, and Canada, the Charter marked the end of the Cold War. It paved the way for a "new Europe" grounded in shared principles of peace, democracy, and cooperation (Kiet et al. 2025). This conflict has not only dismantled the European security system built over more than three decades, but it has also significantly altered global power balances, shaking the foundations of the existing international order.

The conflict has "pushed relations between Russia and the EU to their lowest point in decades since the end of the Cold War" (Zhigao 2024). The deterioration stems from three interconnected mechanisms that explain the severity and rapidity of the diplomatic collapse. First, Russia's actions were perceived by the EU as fundamental violations of the post-1945 international order prohibiting territorial conquest through force, as stipulated in Article 2(4) of

the UN Charter (EC 2023). This represented not merely a bilateral dispute but an existential challenge to the rules-based international system upon which European integration itself depends. Second, the invasion created imminent threat perceptions among European states, particularly those geographically proximate to Russia, triggering "threat-based cohesion," in which external dangers override internal disagreements (Kiet et al. 2026). Third, the conflict validated long-standing Eastern European warnings about Russian revisionism that Western European powers had previously dismissed, creating political imperatives for decisive responses to maintain alliance credibility (Kapitonenko 2025).

The EU responded swiftly and decisively to Russia's actions, framing them as a severe violation of international law and Russia's "aggression" against a sovereign state. Since the conflict began, the EU has demonstrated strong solidarity in imposing comprehensive sanctions against Russia, though significant internal divisions persist beneath the surface of this unity. Countries such as Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Slovakia under Prime Minister Robert Fico have maintained closer ties with Moscow, reflecting genuine economic dependencies, particularly on Russian nuclear energy technology and gas transit revenues, and domestic political calculations rather than mere ideological affinity. As of February 2024, the EU had adopted 13 sanctions packages and was considering a 14th, illustrating the bloc's determination to pressure Russia (Al Jazeera 2024). European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen wrote on social media, "I welcome the agreement on our 13th sanctions package against Russia. We must continue to undermine Putin's war machine" (Al Jazeera 2024).

The EU has taken the most decisive steps in the energy sector, which historically formed the foundation of EU–Russia relations and even underpinned cooperation between Western European countries and the Soviet Union during the Cold War following the completion of the Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhgorod pipeline in 1983. Although only one pipeline with a capacity of 32 billion cubic meters per year was completed due to US obstruction (Kiet et al. 2023), the Urengoy–Pomary–Uzhgorod pipeline became an important "bridge" for long-term energy cooperation between the Soviet Union and Western Europe during the Cold War. The deliberate targeting of energy relationships demonstrates Europe's recognition that economic interdependence, once viewed as a stabilizing force promoting peaceful relations, had instead created vulnerabilities that Russia could weaponize for political leverage (Raik et al. 2024).

To demonstrate Europe's political determination to reduce dependence on Russian energy sources, the EU banned exports of oil refining technology to Russia and completely prohibited imports of crude oil, coal, and petroleum products transported by sea from Russia (EC 2023). Moreover, the EU, together with the G7, implemented a price cap on Russian petroleum products to limit Russia's revenue from oil exports to third countries (EC 2023). The EU also revoked Russia's most-favored-nation status under the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework and banned most trade, service, and investment activities with Moscow (Fact Sheets on the EU 2024).

However, the sanctions architecture faces significant constraints that complicate its strategic effectiveness. Russia's wartime economy adapted through import substitution, parallel imports via third countries such as Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, and expanded trade relationships with China, India, and other non-Western partners (Drăgoi 2024). The effectiveness of the oil price cap has been undermined by Russia's "shadow fleet" of tankers operating under

CC BY

flags of convenience and alternative payment mechanisms that bypass Western financial systems (Rodriguez-Diaz et al. 2025). This reveals a fundamental tension in economic statecraft: Western sanctions can inflict economic pain but struggle to prevent a determined major power from sustaining military operations when alternative markets and suppliers exist. Additionally, sanctions have imposed reciprocal costs on European economies, as energy price spikes following Russian gas supply disruptions contributed to inflation and economic slowdown, placing significant strain on European households and industries.

At the same time, the Russia–Ukraine conflict has pushed relations between Russia and Western countries to their lowest point since the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. Under collective political unity, the EU has imposed 2,842 sanctions and accelerated the process of decoupling economic activity from Russia (Castellum 2025). Arbeloa (2023) observed that the EU withdrew most major corporations and enterprises from Russia in 2022 and planned to reduce energy imports from Russia from 50% in 2021 to 0% by 2027. On the US side, President Joe Biden actively mobilized NATO allies to confront Russia across political-diplomatic, economic-trade, and defense-security spheres. As of January 2025, the US had imposed 7,384 sanctions and implemented comprehensive diplomatic isolation against Russia, including sanctions against up to 21,629 individuals allegedly connected to the conflict (Castellum 2025). However, the effectiveness of this comprehensive pressure campaign remains contested. While Russia's economy has experienced significant stress, it has not collapsed as some Western policymakers anticipated. GDP contraction has been less severe than projected, unemployment remains relatively low, and military production has increased. This resilience stems from several factors: Russia's large domestic market and natural resource wealth provide buffers against external pressure; trade reorientation toward non-Western partners partially offsets the loss of European markets; and authoritarian political structures enable resource mobilization and the suppression of domestic opposition in ways that democratic societies cannot easily replicate (Drăgoi 2024).

Therefore, the Russia–Ukraine conflict has also led to a renewed confrontation between NATO and Russia, a dynamic that had essentially ended with the dissolution of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact in 1991. NATO now considers Russia the most direct threat to European security and the target of comprehensive deterrence and containment strategies for the foreseeable future. NATO (2025) has declared that the conflict marks "the end of the post–Cold War period in Europe," representing a turning point in Western security policy. The conflict consolidated NATO unity through threat-based mechanisms that override previous internal divisions. Sweden's and Finland's accession to NATO, abandoning neutrality policies that lasted 200 and 70 years, respectively, demonstrates how perceptions of imminent threat fundamentally altered strategic calculations, even among traditionally nonaligned states.

Although the Russia–Ukraine conflict has strengthened cohesion among Western countries, it has simultaneously created momentum for Russia and China to deepen diplomatic and security cooperation to counter what they perceive as US unilateralism supported by Western allies. This has contributed to growing polarization in the international system, with two opposing poles gradually forming: Russia–China (along with important partners such as North Korea and Iran) confronting the United States and its Western allies.

In this context, the EU has made significant strategic adjustments to adapt to the new geopolitical environment. Rather than maintaining a balanced policy between Russia and China or pursuing relative "independence" from the United States as it did before the Russia–Ukraine

CC BY

conflict in 2022, the EU has shifted toward consolidating a "solid alliance" with the US and positioning NATO as the strategic military alliance responsible for defending European security against threats from Russia along the eastern flank (Kiet et al. 2025). However, this adjustment is implemented in a flexible, sophisticated, and balanced manner, ensuring that the EU does not become "overly dependent" on the US and maintains its strategic autonomy in regional and international affairs, particularly in economic and trade matters. Simultaneously, the EU is actively leveraging "soft power" through doctrines, policies, and initiatives in economic, trade, and cultural-social spheres to pursue strategies aligned with the bloc's interests (Raik et al. 2024). Specifically, at the 2022 EU Summit, the bloc proposed the "Dialogue among World Democracies" initiative to promote mutual understanding and awareness between East and West on democratic and human rights issues in the current context of globalization. These strategic moves reflect the EU's ambitions to build a multipolar international order in which Western countries remain central pillars of the liberal world order.

The emerging geopolitical structure reveals complexities beyond a simple bipolar confrontation. The security dilemma dynamic, in which measures taken to enhance one's security reduce others' security, triggering reciprocal responses in self-reinforcing cycles, is already evident: NATO's expansion to include Sweden and Finland prompted Russian military district reorganizations and threats of nuclear weapons deployment in Belarus (Harding 2025). However, this framework also reveals fundamental disagreements over causality. From Russia's perspective, NATO expansion represents not merely defensive measures but an offensive strategy aimed at encircling and containing Russian power, thus justifying preemptive actions to prevent further encroachment (Kiet et al. 2026). From the Western perspective, expansion responds to sovereign states' voluntary requests for protection against demonstrated Russian aggression, making it a consequence rather than a cause of Russian behavior (Kapitonenko 2025). This fundamental disagreement over whether NATO expansion provoked or responded to Russian revisionism perpetuates mutual mistrust and complicates diplomatic resolution.

MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND DEFENSE INDUSTRY BOOM: EUROPE'S STRATEGIC REARMAMENT

The Russia–Ukraine conflict has triggered the most significant military transformation in Europe since the end of the Cold War, fundamentally reshaping defense spending patterns, strategic doctrines, and industrial capabilities across the continent and globally.

European defense spending among NATO members surged by 30% to $454 billion in 2024 (SIPRI 2025), driven by three interconnected dynamics. First, Russian military aggression shattered post–Cold War assumptions about the obsolescence of major-power war. The full-scale invasion validated previously dismissed threat assessments, particularly in Eastern Europe, explaining Poland's dramatic 31% spending increase ($38 billion, 4.2% of GDP) and Germany's historic reversal, a 28% rise to $88.5 billion representing the Zeitenwende announced by Chancellor Scholz, which abandoned decades of military restraint rooted in post–World War II pacifist culture (TVP World 2025). Second, the conflict exposed European unpreparedness for high-intensity conventional warfare. Ammunition stockpiles proved insufficient for sustained operations, air defense systems were inadequate for mass missile attacks, and logistics infrastructure was unprepared for rapid reinforcement. These shortcomings created urgent

CC BY

pressure to modernize capabilities, reflected in the EU's investment in air defense architecture such as the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI), which aims to establish a multi-layered shield system (Patriot, IRIS-T, NASAMS), and the SAFE program (Security Actions for Europe), which funds joint procurement of missiles, drones, and artillery, boosting defense industrial production under the European Rearmament/Readiness 2030 program (SIPRI 2025). The conflict thus functioned as a comprehensive stress test, revealing systemic weaknesses that decades of peace had allowed to develop. Third, America's strategic pivot toward competition with China in the Indo-Pacific has put pressure on European allies to share the burden. While President Biden reinvigorated transatlantic commitment, the US prioritization of China means European security increasingly depends on European capabilities, accelerating EU initiatives toward strategic autonomy through Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF).

The defense industry boom, Western defense revenues rising 11% to $212 billion in early 2023 and projected to reach $554 billion by 2026 (SIPRI 2024), reflects both cyclical demand surges and structural transformations. Cyclically, weapons transfers to Ukraine and European rearmament created immediate backlogs in orders for major contractors such as Lockheed Martin, Rheinmetall, and BAE Systems. However, structural factors suggest this trend transcends temporary spikes. First, the conflict demonstrated the battlefield effectiveness of specific systems, Turkish Bayraktar drones, US Javelin missiles, and HIMARS, creating demonstration effects that drive global procurement (Beccaro and Cristadoro 2025). Countries observing Ukraine's successful defense seek similar capabilities, expanding demand beyond Europe. This helps explain Japan's increase in defense spending to 8.9 trillion yen, with a commitment to reach 2% of GDP by 2027, reflecting regional concerns about Russia–China military cooperation near Japanese waters (Nippon 2024).

Second, defense production faces significant capacity constraints that complicate rapid expansion. Artillery ammunition production requires specialized facilities, skilled labor, and strict quality control that cannot scale quickly. Manufacturers struggle to meet Ukraine's consumption rates while rebuilding depleted stockpiles and fulfilling new orders, creating bottlenecks in which demand vastly exceeds supply, driving prices upward, and incentivizing long-term capacity expansion (Beccaro and Cristadoro 2025). Third, technological competition accelerates investment in next-generation capabilities, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, hypersonic weapons, and cyber warfare, where first-mover advantages create strategic dynamics (Beccaro and Cristadoro 2025). The conflict serves as a proving ground for these technologies, shaping global procurement patterns.

European rearmament also reveals tensions between NATO's collective framework and national strategic autonomy pursuits, manifesting in three areas. First, Eastern European nations prioritize immediate conventional deterrence, procuring tanks, artillery, and air defense systems primarily from US manufacturers to ensure interoperability and logistics access. Second, France and Germany, while contributing to collective defense, simultaneously invest in indigenous European industry, such as France's SCAF fighter program with Germany and Spain, to reduce long-term dependency on the United States and preserve European technological capacity (Martin 2025). Third, capability priorities vary by region: Baltic states and Poland concentrate on territorial defense against Russian threats from the east; Nordic countries emphasize Arctic capabilities and Baltic Sea control; Southern European nations face different threats, migration

CC BY

from North Africa, Sahel instability, and Eastern Mediterranean competition, leading to priorities such as naval assets and expeditionary forces.

Burden-sharing debates persist despite spending increases. Although many NATO members now meet the 2% GDP threshold, defense spending effectiveness varies dramatically (SIPRI 2025). Personnel costs consume disproportionate budgets in some countries without generating operational capabilities, while others achieve greater returns through efficient procurement and force optimization. Germany's difficulty in converting increased spending into combat-ready forces, where only a small portion of the Bundeswehr meets full readiness standards, illustrates that spending levels alone do not guarantee capability improvements.

While rearmament may strengthen deterrence, several counterarguments warrant consideration. First, the offensive–defensive distinction in military systems remains ambiguous. Systems procured for "defensive deterrence," such as long-range strike missiles and forward-deployed forces, can appear offensive to an adversary, potentially triggering preemptive actions during crises. This suggests that capability buildups, while individually rational, may collectively increase systemic instability.

Second, Europe's $693 billion in military spending (SIPRI 2025) diverts resources from alternative security investments. Climate adaptation, pandemic preparedness, cyber resilience, and economic competitiveness may yield greater long-term security benefits than conventional military capabilities. This raises questions about the optimal composition of security investment portfolios in an era characterized by diverse, interconnected threats.

Third, the defense industry boom creates vested interests in sustaining high military spending. Military–industrial complex dynamics, where contractors, military bureaucracies, and political constituencies align to perpetuate procurement programs regardless of strategic necessity, can drive spending beyond objective security requirements.

MULTIDIMENSIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES: NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS IN POST-2022 EUROPE

Terror Networks and Migration Waves: The Twin Security Dilemma

The geopolitical instability generated by the Russia–Ukraine conflict has created conducive conditions for terrorist organizations to intensify activities across Europe. Contemporary threats include jihadist terrorism, extreme right-wing terrorism, left-wing anarchism, and nationalist separatism. Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó warned that "extremist groups could exploit the situation to carry out new attacks in Europe" (Spaaij et al. 2024). The proliferation of extremist ideologies, fueled by the Russia–Ukraine conflict, the Israel–Hamas war, and broader instability in the Middle East and North Africa, has incited violence and exacerbated migration pressures.

Europol reports (2024) document alarming trends since 2022. Between 2020 and 2023, terrorist activity escalated, with 2023 alone recording 120 attacks (98 completed, 9 failed, and 13 prevented) across seven EU Member States. In the first half of 2024, Europol conducted 30 arrest operations targeting extremist Islamic groups, the highest number ever recorded. French President Emmanuel Macron asserted that "the level of terrorist threat that Europe currently faces is unprecedented in history" (Europol 2024). Europe now confronts sophisticated terrorist

CC BY

networks that exploit communication channels for propaganda and recruitment, increasingly targeting native European citizens. These groups employ diverse tactics, such as truck rammings, bombings, and shootings, targeting public events and crowded spaces to maximize casualties and spread psychological terror, creating significant challenges for European counter-terrorism forces.

Furthermore, the migration crisis in Europe has increased in complexity since the outbreak of the Russia–Ukraine conflict, creating a massive wave of migrants from Ukraine to EU Member States, particularly those geographically adjacent to Ukraine. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), by early 2025, the number of Ukrainian refugees who left their homeland had reached 6.8 million. Moreover, the Director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council, Michta (2024), estimated that "Ukrainians actually fleeing the war could be close to 10 million people, as it is now believed that only about 27–30 million people remain in Ukraine." However, the EU must not only cope with migration flows from Ukraine but also address a more complex, multidimensional migration landscape as geopolitical instability spreads globally, particularly in Africa and the Middle East.

In 2023 alone, Europe received approximately 4.5 million immigrants, including 3.5 million legal migrants and 1 million irregular migrants (Michta 2024). The irregular migrant population primarily originates from Africa and the Middle East, with Syria leading the list, followed by West African countries and Afghanistan. The current situation bears concerning similarities to the 2015 migration crisis, when the Syrian civil war escalated sharply and geopolitical instability spread across the Middle East and North Africa, particularly in Iraq and Libya. The current crisis may be even more severe, as some groups have used violence against border control forces (Europol 2024).

Eastern European leaders have expressed concerns about the security risks associated with the influx of Ukrainian refugees, emphasizing "the urgent need for closer coordination among countries to ensure border security, minimize regional risks, while strengthening cooperation and implementing economic recovery measures as the Russia–Ukraine conflict continues" (Europol 2024). During Hungary's second term as EU Council President (July 1, 2024–December 31, 2024), Prime Minister Viktor Orbán acknowledged the seriousness of migration issues in Europe, stating, "The migration crisis has reached levels not seen since 2015. Security threats threaten to paralyze and divide the Schengen area" (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2024). Poland is the EU member state hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with approximately 1 million people as of early 2025 (UNHCR 2025).

Declining birth rates across Europe, combined with population growth driven by immigration and tensions related to cultural integration and religious differences, have made developing a viable immigration policy a strategic priority for the EU. To address the escalating migration crisis, the EU adopted a new Migration and Asylum Pact in May 2024, which clearly defines mechanisms for handling irregular entry into the bloc. Core provisions include screening asylum seekers at entry points and deporting them immediately upon rejection of their asylum applications (EC 2024a). During Hungary's second term as EU Council President, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán called for strengthened protection of external border routes, arguing that when irregular migrant groups use violence against border forces, "the EU's external borders must be protected, and the defense work of frontline countries protecting all of Europe, their work must

CC BY

be recognized and their defense work must be supported" (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2024).

However, challenges regarding border control and asylum law, though complex, do not compare with deeper tensions related to population aging in Europe and the cultural integration and assimilation of non-European immigrants, particularly those from Islamic countries. Therefore, the migration crisis has the potential to continue to polarize European policymakers and an increasingly dissatisfied public, particularly in the most affected countries in Southern and Western Europe. Terrorist attacks in Europe carried out by extremist Islamic elements, particularly in Madrid and London, along with cases of radicalization among European Muslims, have contributed to growing suspicion and anger among the public. These cultural tensions are deeply felt, with politicians opposing large-scale immigration arguing that Europe is facing migration flows, particularly from Africa and the Middle East, that are changing the ethnic and cultural structure of the continent from a civilization rooted in Judeo-Christian traditions for over two millennia into a multicultural and multi-religious space (Michta 2024).

Energy Independence Revolution: From Russian Dependence to the Green Transition

In the context of increasingly complex global geopolitics and economics, energy security has become one of the European Union's most significant challenges. Severe dependence on external energy sources, particularly from Russia, combined with recent fluctuations in international relations, has placed the EU before numerous challenges in ensuring energy security while maintaining sustainable economic development (Kiet et al. 2023). According to Eurostat (2024a), the EU produces only about 37% of its energy needs and must import approximately 63%. The EU's energy structure mainly comprises five primary sources: crude oil and petroleum products (37%), natural gas (21%), renewable energy (18%), solid fossil fuels (13%), and nuclear energy (11%) (Eurostat 2024a). This demonstrates the EU's significant dependence on traditional energy sources, particularly oil and natural gas, with Russia historically providing the cheapest supply for the entire European region.

Global development trends forecast that energy demand will increase by 27% by 2030, with the EU expected to import half of its energy consumption at a cost exceeding 1 billion euros per day (IEA 2023). This reflects a concerning reality that the EU recognized early on. The European Commission's first Green Paper, issued in the early 2000s, already warned of severe future energy shortages as industrialization and modernization intensified. Accordingly, the EU could be forced to import up to 70% of its natural gas, 90% of its oil, and 100% of its coal within the next two to three decades (Kiet et al. 2023). This dependence is particularly evident in the energy relationship between the EU and Russia. In 2021, the EU imported approximately 155 billion cubic meters of gas from Russia, accounting for about 40% of the union's total gas imports (Sadowska 2022). This made Russia the EU's largest gas supplier, creating severe energy dependence and constraints. Even as the conflict continues, many EU members, including Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, still rely on Russian energy imports via intermediaries.

However, the Russia–Ukraine conflict completely changed the EU's energy security landscape. Combined with the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, and EU-imposed sanctions on Russia, the situation led to a severe energy crisis. Energy prices,

CC BY

particularly for electricity and gas, skyrocketed not only within the EU but also globally. The conflict caused severe disruptions in global energy supply chains, pushing crude oil and gas prices to record levels in Europe (Sadowska 2022). The direct consequence was a serious threat to EU economic growth, which was still recovering from the COVID-19 pandemic. This situation put intense pressure on the EU and its Member States to quickly adjust their energy policies.

In response, the EU set forth a series of objectives and strategies in the REPowerEU plan in May 2022 to ensure energy security, promote renewable energy development, increase energy efficiency, and advance environmental protection and climate change mitigation. This strategy includes diversifying energy supply sources and redirecting focus toward renewable energy development. The EU set the ambitious goal of reducing dependence on Russian fossil fuels and moving toward ending their use by 2027. To achieve this, the EU has invested heavily in wind and solar energy farms, expanded renewable gas production, and strengthened the European electricity grid to integrate more renewable energy. The European Commission estimates that by 2030, the bloc will need additional investments of 113 billion euros (123 billion USD) in renewable energy and hydrogen infrastructure to end its dependence on Russian fuels (IEA 2023). Additionally, the EU is actively integrating objectives across energy and environmental policies.

This principle serves as the foundation and guiding framework for all EU energy and environmental policy programs. The EU not only employs mechanisms, policies, and legal frameworks at the regional level but also actively cooperates with third countries and international organizations to advance global agreements and conventions on environment and energy (Sadowska 2022). In multilateral environmental negotiations, EU Member States participate as a unified bloc, demonstrating the union's solidarity and determination in addressing global challenges. This approach not only strengthens the EU's international position but also enhances the effectiveness of implementing environmental and energy objectives.

The REPowerEU plan has delivered positive results after more than two years of implementation, marking a historic turning point in the global energy landscape and demonstrating Europe's capacity for rapid, effective transformation. The EU has achieved a significant energy transition, reducing gas imports from Russia from 45% in 2021 (before the Russia–Ukraine conflict) to only 15% in 2024, an outstanding political and economic achievement, given decades of dependence on Russia's relatively inexpensive energy (ESG News 2024). The most impressive development is the shift in Europe's energy structure: for the first time in history, Europe produced more electricity from renewable sources than from gas. With new solar capacity reaching 96 GW and wind capacity reaching 33 GW, the EU has not only strengthened energy security but also reaffirmed its leadership in the global green transition (ESG News 2024). Thus, the EU has achieved initial success with the REPowerEU plan, reducing geopolitical risk and opening a new era of sustainable energy independence.

However, despite commitments to end all energy agreements with Russia by 2027, some European countries still cannot completely sever energy cooperation with Moscow. The EU imported a record 16.5 million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia in 2024, exceeding the 15.2 million tons imported in 2023 (Financial Times 2024). Slovakia, France, Hungary, Austria, and Spain were among the largest importers of Russian energy. This dependence extends beyond gas to the nuclear sector, where Russia controls 44% of global uranium enrichment capacity and supplies nearly 20% of Europe's raw uranium (Hockenos

CC BY

2025). Countries such as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary remain entirely dependent on Russian nuclear fuel and technology. Additionally, Russia's "shadow fleet" of foreign-flagged oil tankers continues to transport Russian petroleum products into the EU market via third countries such as India and China, creating "loopholes in the sanctions regime" and complicating the EU's efforts to entirely sever its energy ties with Russia (Rodriguez-Diaz et al. 2025).

Global Food Crisis to European Recovery: Transforming Agricultural Security

The Russia–Ukraine conflict has had severe consequences for food security in Europe and globally. Russia and Ukraine play pivotal roles in the global food supply chain, accounting for a substantial share of key agricultural commodities. Together, these two countries produce approximately 30% of global wheat, 32% of barley, 17% of corn, and 75% of sunflower oil (Hassen et al. 2022). Supply disruptions from this region have placed enormous pressure on international food markets, driving prices upward and threatening the food security of many countries, particularly those that rely heavily on imports. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) recorded the largest increase in its food price index in 2022, surpassing the previous record set in 2008 (FAO 2022). This reflects both supply scarcity and broader concerns about global food security. The FAO further warned that if the conflict continues to reduce food exports, the number of malnourished people worldwide could increase by 8–13 million (FAO 2022). These impacts were evident in 2022, when Africa suffered most due to its reliance on imports from Russia and Ukraine, which accounted for over 50% of grain imports in many African countries (Mottaleb et al. 2022). Many nations in the region already face persistent instability and poverty, and disruptions to food supply chains have further increased import costs and deepened humanitarian vulnerability.

Western economic sanctions against Russia have also worsened the situation by disrupting Russia's export capacity, thereby affecting global food supplies. The US Department of Agriculture estimated that wheat exports from Russia and Ukraine could decline by 7 million tons, a 12% reduction compared to the previous season (Hassen et al. 2022). This decline creates a significant gap in global food supply, posing serious challenges for the international community in ensuring food security. The conflict's impact has also been felt strongly in Europe. Wheat, corn, and other grains from Russia and Ukraine are essential inputs for many of the region's widely consumed products. French President Emmanuel Macron emphasized the severity of the situation, stating that "Europe and Africa will lose deep food stability" and that Europe will need to reassess production strategies to protect food and nutrition sovereignty. At the same time, many African countries may face famine within 12–18 months due to the conflict (Ha 2022). In addition to the risk of shortages, European countries have faced rising inflationary pressure. Global food prices reached record highs in March 2022, with vegetable oil prices rising by 58% and overall food prices increasing by 34% compared to March 2021 (EC 2024b). European countries experienced grain price shocks of approximately 20% immediately after the conflict began (EC 2024b).

Facing severe food security challenges, the European Commission (EC) implemented a series of emergency response measures. The EC allocated €450 million from the "Crisis Reserve Fund" to support European farmers in managing price volatility. Since the onset of the Russia–

CC BY

Ukraine conflict, wheat prices in Europe have increased by 50%, reaching nearly €400 per ton, while corn prices have risen by approximately 30%, to around €350 per ton (Mottaleb et al. 2022). Additionally, the EC proposed establishing notable transportation routes, known as "solidarity lanes," to use EU infrastructure to help Ukraine export 20 million tons of grain (Mottaleb et al. 2022). This initiative not only supports Ukraine's agricultural exports but also helps stabilize global food supplies.

At the international level, coordinated efforts have been made to address the food security crisis. The EU, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and more than 20 countries, including the United States, issued a joint statement emphasizing that response measures should "cause the least possible disruption" and comply with WTO regulations to "create conditions for the most effective possible market operation and food flows" (World Bank 2025). The statement specifically urged countries not to impose bans or restrictions on food exports purchased by the UN World Food Programme for humanitarian purposes. This reflects the international community's commitment to protecting humanitarian relief efforts and ensuring food supplies for the most vulnerable populations. The statement also highlighted the need for adequate funding, underscoring that the international community recognizes that substantial investment and financial support, especially for developing and vulnerable countries, are essential to address the food security crisis effectively.

The year 2024 marked an important transitional period for food security in Europe, as the region showed signs of recovery due to strategic policy adjustments and improvements in global supply chains. Globally, in 2024, nearly 300 million people experienced high levels of acute food insecurity (EC 2024b). However, Europe showed a positive trend: the Europe and Central Asia region recorded a 4.1% decrease in the number of people facing moderate or severe food insecurity in 2024 (EC 2024b). Eurostat (2024b) reported that global food prices fell to their lowest levels in three years, and average food inflation in Europe dropped to 2.5%, compared with 9.2% in 2022. This improvement was driven by three main factors: (a) reduced inflation, (b) increased incomes, and (c) strengthened supply chains. Consequently, European countries have made progress in rebuilding food security systems, reducing dependence on Ukraine and Russia, and strengthening cooperation with other trading partners.

CONCLUSION

The Russia–Ukraine conflict has fundamentally transformed European security architecture across multiple interconnected dimensions, marking a decisive rupture with the post–Cold War order established in the early 1990s. This analysis demonstrates how the conflict catalyzed profound restructuring across five critical domains during the Biden administration, each reinforcing and amplifying the others, shaping European geopolitics for decades.

Diplomatically, the conflict shattered the illusion of stable cooperation between Russia and the West, pushing relations to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. The EU's unprecedented sanctions packages and Russia's strategic pivot toward China and other non–Western partners signal an emerging bipolar international system in which neutral space is increasingly constrained. Militarily, Europe experienced its most significant rearmament in generations, with NATO members substantially increasing defense spending and abandoning long-held pacifist traditions, as evidenced by Sweden's and Finland's historic NATO accession.

CC BY

This represents not merely quantitative increases but a qualitative transformation in strategic thinking, from post–Cold War peace dividends toward comprehensive defense readiness.

Non-traditional security challenges proved equally transformative. The dual migration crisis, mass Ukrainian refugee flows combined with continued arrivals from Africa and the Middle East, exposed deep tensions between humanitarian obligations and cultural integration capacity, fueling political polarization across the continent. Simultaneously, terrorism threats intensified, as extremist groups exploited geopolitical instability to expand operations. Nevertheless, the conflict also revealed European resilience: the REPowerEU plan achieved notable success in substantially reducing Russian gas dependence while accelerating the renewable energy transition, and coordinated international responses helped stabilize global food markets despite initial severe disruptions.

These findings underscore three critical implications for future scholarship and policy. First, European security has entered an era of strategic autonomy in which dependence on external powers, whether Russian energy or American military protection, is increasingly seen as vulnerability rather than interdependence. Second, the conflict demonstrates that non-traditional security challenges, energy, food, and migration, have become as strategically significant as conventional military threats, requiring integrated policy responses that transcend traditional domain boundaries. Third, the emerging geopolitical landscape suggests that multilateral cooperation and diplomatic engagement remain essential to prevent escalation into a broader confrontation that would weaken both Russia and Europe while empowering other global powers. The path forward requires balancing deterrence with dialogue, defense preparedness with diplomatic flexibility, and strategic autonomy with alliance solidarity, complex combinations that will define European security for the foreseeable future.

CRediT AUTHOR STATEMENT

Nghiem Tuan Hung: conceptualization, writing - original draft, funding acquisition. **Hoang Khac Nam:** data curation, writing - original draft, supervision. **Le Hoang Kiet:** methodology, writing - original draft, writing - review and editing.

All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the article.

CC BY

COMPLIANCE WITH ETHICAL STANDARDS

Acknowledgments:
Not applicable.

Funding:
This research is an output of the academic project "International Politics and Security in 2026 and Prospects for 2027," funded by the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences. The project is led by Dr. Nghiem Tuan Hung and hosted by the Institute for European and American Studies.

AI Declaration:
The authors acknowledge the use of AI tools, specifically Copilot, to assist in translating and enhancing the clarity and quality of the English language in this manuscript. These AI tools were employed solely for language refinement and were not involved in the conceptualization, analysis, or development of the scientific content. The authors assume full responsibility for the manuscript's originality, accuracy, validity, and integrity.

Statement of Human Rights:
This article does not contain any studies with human participants performed by any of the authors.

Statement on the Welfare of Animals:
This article does not contain any studies with animals performed by any authors.

Informed Consent:
Not applicable.

Disclosure statement:
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author/s.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Neutrality Statement on Jurisdictional Claims and Institutional Affiliations:

The publisher and the journal remain neutral regarding jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Language Quality and Author Responsibility Policy:

The publisher and the journal use AI-assistive tools to enhance the language quality of accepted articles. These tools help refine grammar, clarity, and readability while preserving the integrity of the original text. However, authors retain full responsibility for the accuracy and content of their work.

Disclaimer on External Links:

The publisher and the journal cannot be held responsible for the content of external websites or any broken or missing links within the article. Authors are solely responsible for ensuring the accuracy and functionality of all hyperlinks at the time of submission.

REFERENCES

1. Aljazeera. 2024. "EU Approves New Sanctions against Russia over Ukraine War." *Aljazeera*. Accessed January 14, 2025. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/21/eu-approves-new-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-war
2. Arbeloa, Ignacio Urbasos. 2024. "The Future of Russian Gas in the EU." *Elcano Royal Institute*. Accessed February 22, 2025. Available at: https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/policy-paper/the-future-of-russian-gas-in-the-eu/
3. Beccaro, Andrea, and Giampiero Nani Cristadoro. 2025. "The Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine and What We Can Learn from It." *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2025.2610825.
4. Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister. 2024. "Press Statement by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at an International Press Conference." *Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister*. Accessed March 7, 2025. Available at: https://miniszterelnok.hu/en/press-statement-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-at-an-international-press-conference/
5. Castellum. 2025. "Russia Sanctions Dashboard." *Castellum*. Accessed January 14, 2026. Available at: https://www.castellum.ai/russia-sanctions-dashboard
6. Drăgoi, Andreea-Emanuela. 2024. "Key Drivers of the Russian Economy's Resilience Despite Post-Ukraine War Sanctions." *Economy and Sociology* 2: 58–70. https://doi.org/10.36004/nier.es.2024.2-06.
7. ESG News. 2024. "EU Reveals 18% Gas Reduction and 46% Renewable Energy Surge in REPowerEU Success Story." *ESG News*. Accessed May 24, 2025. Available at: https://esgnews.com/eu-reveals-18-gas-reduction-and-46-renewable-energy-surge-in-repowereu-success-story/
8. European Commission. 2023. "Ukraine: EU and G7 Partners Agree Price Cap on Russian Petroleum Products." *European Commission*. Accessed February 15, 2025. Available at: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/ukraine-eu-and-g7-partners-agree-price-cap-russian-petroleum-products-2023-02-04_en
9. European Commission. 2024a. "Pact on Migration and Asylum." *European Commission*. Accessed January 13, 2025. Available at: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en
10. European Commission. 2024b. *2nd Report on the State of Food Security in the EU (Spring 2024).* Accessed June 13, 2025. Available at: https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a91b3841-6021-489e-b877-7f0f5278c88c_en?filename=efscm-assessment-spring-2024_en.pdf
11. European Parliament. 2024. "Russia." *Fact Sheets on the EU*. Accessed June 15, 2025. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/177/russia
12. Europol. 2024. *European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2024.* Accessed January 11, 2025.

Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/publication-events/main-reports/european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2024-eu-te-sat#downloads
13. Eurostat. 2024a. "Shedding Light on Energy in Europe – 2024 Edition." *Eurostat*. Accessed March 22, 2025.
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/wdn-20240314-1
14. Eurostat. 2024b. "Consumer Prices – Inflation." *Eurostat*. Accessed May 23, 2025.
Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Consumer_prices_-_inflation
15. Financial Times. 2024. "EU Imports Record Quantities of Russian LNG in 2024." *Financial Times*. Accessed January 16, 2025.
Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/ef4230c1-befa-4053-97b2-397c69c20002
16. Fetzer, T., and Ivan Nikolovski. 2025. "The Russo-Ukrainian War and Memory Politics in International Relations." *Global Studies Quarterly* 5 (4): ksaf109.
https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksaf109.
17. Food and Agriculture Organization. 2022. "The Importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for Global Agricultural Markets and the Risks Associated with the War in Ukraine." *FAO*. Accessed January 25, 2025.
Available at: https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/bd0267ca-75a6-44d6-a387-7ebeb150630d/content
18. Ha, Manh. 2022. "Europe and Africa Face Food Security Challenges Due to Ukraine Conflict." *Voice of Vietnam*. Accessed January 14, 2025.
Available at: https://vov.vn/the-gioi/chau-au-va-chau-phi-doi-mat-thach-thuc-an-ninh-luong-thuc-do-xung-dot-ukraine-post930137.vov
19. Harding, Luke. 2025. "Russia Claims to Have Moved Nuclear-Capable Missile System into Belarus." *The Guardian*. Accessed January 16, 2026.
Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/dec/30/russia-claims-moved-nuclear-capable-missile-system-belarus
20. Hassen, Tarek Ben, and Hamid El Bilali. 2022. "Impacts of the Russia-Ukraine War on Global Food Security: Towards More Sustainable and Resilient Food Systems?" *Foods* 11 (15): 2301. https://doi.org/10.3390/foods11152301.
21. Hockenos, Paul. 2025. "Europe Somehow Still Depends on Russia's Energy." *Foreign Policy*. Accessed January 15, 2026.
Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/01/03/europe-russia-ukraine-war-energy-imports-oil-gas-pipeline/
22. International Energy Agency. 2023. "The Energy World Is Set to Change Significantly by 2030, Based on Today's Policy Settings Alone." *IEA*. Accessed June 6, 2025.
Available at: https://www.iea.org/news/the-energy-world-is-set-to-change-significantly-by-2030-based-on-today-s-policy-settings-alone
23. Kapitonenko, Mykola. 2025. "Ukraine's Geostrategic Responses to the Challenges of Geopolitical 'Inbetweenness': From Multivectorism to (Under)balancing and Fighting the War of Independence." *European Security* 34 (4): 646–669.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2025.2580245.

24. Kiet, Le Hoang, and Tran Xuan Hiep. 2025. "Geopolitical Conflict between Great Powers in the 21st Century: An Analysis of the Ukraine Crisis." *Sovremenaya Evropa* 129 (1): 121–135. https://doi.org/10.31857/S0201708325010103.
25. Kiet, Le Hoang, Tran Xuan Hiep, Tran Van Thong, and Nguyen Anh Minh. 2023. "The EU's Process of Diversifying Supply Sources and Reducing Dependence on Energy Sources from Russia." *Ho Chi Minh City University of Education Journal of Science* 20 (12): 2162–2172. https://doi.org/10.54607/hcmue.js.20.12.3912(2023).
26. Kiet, Le Hoang, Pranjal Khare, and Tran Xuan Hiep. 2026. "The Resurgence of Realism in International Relations: Examining the Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Its Implications for Vietnam's Foreign Policy." In *Shifting Power Dynamics in International Relations: From Unipolar Hegemony to Multipolarity*, edited by M. Özel Özcan, 301–320. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3373-2342-8.ch012.
27. Martin, Tim. 2025. "France, Spain Reassert Faith in Europe's Next-Gen Future Fighter, but Germany Stays Mum." *Breaking Defense*. Accessed January 14, 2026. Available at: https://breakingdefense.com/2025/12/france-spain-reassert-faith-in-europes-next-gen-future-fighter-but-germany-stays-mum/
28. Michta, Andrew. 2024. "Migration Is Remaking Europe: Is There a Workable Path Forward for the Continent?" *Hoover Institution*. Accessed May 15, 2025. Available at: https://www.hoover.org/research/migration-remaking-europe-there-workable-path-forward-continent
29. Mottaleb, Khondoker Abdul, Gideon Kruseman, and Sieglinde Snapp. 2022. "Potential Impacts of Ukraine-Russia Armed Conflict on Global Wheat Food Security: A Quantitative Exploration." *Global Food Security* 35 (3): 100659. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2022.100659.
30. NATO. 2025. "NATO's Military Presence in the East of the Alliance." *NATO*. Accessed January 15, 2026. Available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm
31. Nippon. 2024. "Japan's Defense Budget Rising toward NATO Target of 2% of GDP." *Nippon*. Accessed April 13, 2025. Available at: https://www.nippon.com/en/japan-data/h02121/japan%E2%80%99s-defense-budget-rising-toward-nato-target-of-2-of-gdp.html
32. Phong, Xuan. 2024. "Switzerland Will Participate in 24 Military Exercises with NATO." *People's Army Newspaper*. Accessed January 24, 2025. Available at: https://www.qdnd.vn/quoc-te/doi-song/thuy-si-se-tham-gia-24-cuoc-tap-tran-voi-nato-765284
33. Raik, Kristi, Steven Blockmans, Anna Osypchuk, and Anton Suslov. 2024. "EU Policy towards Ukraine: Entering Geopolitical Competition over European Order." *The International Spectator* 59 (1): 39–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2023.2296576.
34. Rodriguez-Diaz, Emilio, Juan Ignacio Alcaide, and Nieves Endrina. 2025. "Shadow Fleets: A Growing Challenge in Global Maritime Commerce." *Applied Sciences* 15 (12): 6424. https://doi.org/10.3390/app15126424.
35. Sadowska, Ewelina. 2022. "The Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian War on the European Union's Energy Security." *Energy Policy Studies* 2 (10): 41–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.62316/SJDE2421.

36. Spaaij, Ramón, and Andrew Zammit. 2024. "The Terrorism Threat to the 2024 Paris Olympics: Learning from the Past to Understand the Present." *The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism*. Accessed May 21, 2025. Available at: https://www.icct.nl/publication/terrorism-threat-2024-paris-olympics-learning-past-understand-present
37. SIPRI. 2024. "Global Military Spending Surges amid War, Rising Tensions and Insecurity." *SIPRI*. Accessed January 14, 2025. Available at: https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2024/global-military-spending-surges-amid-war-rising-tensions-and-insecurity
38. SIPRI. 2025. "Unprecedented Rise in Global Military Expenditure as European and Middle East Spending Surges." *SIPRI*. Accessed January 14, 2026. Available at: https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2025/unprecedented-rise-global-military-expenditure-european-and-middle-east-spending-surges
39. TVP World. 2025. "Global Defense Spending Hits $2.7 Trillion in 2024, Poland's Expenditure Soars 31%." *TVP World*. Accessed January 11, 2026. Available at: https://tvpworld.com/86410255/global-defense-spending-hits-27-trillion-in-2024-polands-expenditure-soars-31
40. UNHCR. 2025. "About the War in Ukraine." *UNHCR*. Accessed January 14, 2026. Available at: https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/
41. USA Facts. 2025. "How Much Money Has the US Given Ukraine since Russia's Invasion?" *USA Facts*. Accessed January 15, 2026. Available at: https://usafacts.org/articles/how-much-money-has-the-us-given-ukraine-since-russias-invasion/
42. US Department of Defense. 2025. "U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine." *US Department of Defense*. Accessed January 17, 2026. Available at: https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/
43. World Bank. 2025. "Food Security Update: World Bank Response to Rising Food Insecurity." *World Bank*. Accessed January 17, 2026. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/agriculture/brief/food-security-update
44. Zhigao, He. 2024. "Are EU-Russia Relations Trapped in a Never-Ending Cycle of Contradiction?" *Global Times*. Accessed May 6, 2025. Available at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202403/1309282.shtml